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I. INTRODUCTION - Democracy and the rule of law in the European Union 
The European Union (EU) has undergone constant political and economic integration 
since its inception in 1952.  It has developed from a community in the aftermath of 
World War Two, into a Union of diverse states with its own political and legal system.  It 
is the best example of international integration and co-operation in the world.   
 
A number of treaties represent the primary law of the EU.  The treaties represent the 
EU’s commitment to promote human rights, freedom, democracy, equality, and the rule 
of law.  The Treaty of Lisbon2 was introduced and adopted by the Member States to 
increase participatory democracy within the EU.  Originally called the Reform Treaty, it 
amended the existing EU and EC treaties, providing the EU with the legal framework to 
meet the future challenges and to respond to the increasing demands of the citizens’ for 
a more transparent and open institution. 
 
The European Parliament is the only directly elected institution of the EU, and 
traditionally had the least amount of power of the EU institutions.  The Lisbon Treaty 
attempted to address the so-called democratic deficit through a range of institutional 
reforms that recognised the importance of European citizen involvement in the EU. 
Citizen involvement in the EU has also been increased through the implementation of 
the European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI).  The ECI represents a further step towards the 
EU becoming a true participatory democracy. 
 
This purpose of this paper is to critically assess the democratic involvement of 
European citizens in the operation of the EU, and how the constitutional foundation of 
the EU provides for this involvement.  The paper will seek to answer to what extent 
European Citizens’ have the ability to affect real and meaningful change upon the EU, a 
power that currently sits with the governments of Member States.   
 
Democracy is often associated with the power of the citizens to affect change in the 
institutions that govern them.  The theory of constituent power goes one step further 
and argues that it gives citizens the ability to alter not only the governing institutions, 
                                                        
2 Official Journal of the European Union 2007 No C 306/1 (herein after referred to as the Treaty of 
Lisbon).  Adopted 2008, entered into force 1 December 2009. 
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but the also the power that those institutions exercise.  This begins with an introduction 
of the main institutions of the EU, before moving to discuss the theory of constituent 
power, before assessing what factors would be necessary for constitutent power to be 
successful in the EU. 
 
II. INSTIUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 
Article 13 TEU provides that the EU has seven institutions.  It states that the EU 
“shall have an institutional framework which shall aim to promote its values, 
advance its objectives, serve its interests, those of its citizens and those of 
the Member States, and ensure the consistency, effectiveness and continuity 
of its policies and actions.”3 
The  Institutions of the EU are; the European Parliament, the European Council, the 
Council, The European Commission (the Commission), the Court of Justice of the 
European Union, the European Central Bank, and the Court of Auditors.  Each institution 
exercises functions that are vital to the effective functioning of the EU.  However, for the 
purposes of this discussion, I will focus on those institutions that exercise primary 
legislative functions for the EU.  These legislative institutions are, the European 
Parliament, the European Commission, the Council.  An examination of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (ECJ) is important, as it is the institution responsible for 
upholding the rule of European Law throughout the EU.  
 
A. The European Parliament 
One of the effects of the Treaty of Lisbon was that it gave “greater emphasis to the EU’s 
values and the rights of its citizens.”4  The European Parliament represents over 500 
million citizens of the EU.  As the only directly elected EU institution, the European 
Parliament exercises a vital role in ensuring the views of European citizens are 
considered when decisions are made at the EU level.  The European Parliament is 
elected by “direct universal suffrage in a free and secret ballot”5 and it is composed “of 
representatives of the Union’s citizens.”6  To ensure that as equal as possible 
representation of Union citizens is maintained, the Treaty on European Union (TEU) 
                                                        
3 Treaty on European Union (TEU), art 13. 
4 C H. Church & D Phinnemore ‘Understanding the Treaty of Lisbon’ Romanian Journal of European 
Affiars, Vol. 10, No. 2, 2010, at 15. 
5 TEU, Art 14(3). 
6 TEU, Art 14(2). 
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requires that “[r]epresentation of citizens shall be degressively proportional, with a 
minimum threshold of six members per Member State, [and] no Member State shall be 
allocated more than ninety-six seats.”7   
 
The participation of Union citizens, through the European Parliament, is supposed to 
enhance the democratic legitimacy of the EU.  “Participation is … conceived as an 
opportunity for citizens … to argue in public deliberation[.]”8  This principle of 
participation was recognised as one of the general principles of good governance in the 
European Commission’s White Paper on European Governance (2001).9  The 
recognition of the necessity for increased participation is crucial for ensuring that Union 
citizens remain engaged with the EU and through the European Parliament, can have 
their interests represented at the transnational level.  In the White Paper, the 
Commission acknowledged that “[t]he quality, relevance and effectiveness of EU policies 
depend on ensuring wide participation throughout the policy chain.”10 
 
The European Parliament, as a transnational democratic representative body, is vital for 
ensuring an “effective and accountable political, administrative and regulative capacity 
at global and regional levels”11 is maintained over the other institutions of the EU.  The 
European Parliament maintains the unique position of legitimising the democratic 
status of the EU.  While it is arguably far from the most powerful institution, for the 
purposes of constituent power, its involvement will prove to be of vital importance. 
 
B. Powers and functions of the European Parliament 
A significant downfall of the European Parliament is that it has no right of legislative 
initiative.  However, the Treaty of Lisbon introduced what is known as the co-decision 
procedure, or ‘the ordinary legislative procedure’.12  Through the ordinary legislative 
procedure the “European Parliament shall, jointly with the Council, exercise legislative 
                                                        
7 Ibid.  
8 Prof. Dr V C Lopez ‘The Lisbon Treaty’s Provisions on Democratic Principles: A Legal Framework for 
Participatory Democracy’, European Public Law 16, no 1 (2010): 123-138 at 124. 
9 ‘European Governance: A White Paper’ COM (2001) 428 final, 25 July 2001. 
10 Ibid at 7. 
11 D Held, ‘Democracy, the Nation-Sate and the Global System’ in Models of Democracy (3rd ed, Stanford 
University Press, Stanford, 2006) at 305. 
12 TEU, Art 14(1). 
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and budgetary functions.”13  The European Parliament has also had its role in 
consenting to EU decisions increased.  For example, its consent is required to be given 
“to the Multi-annual Financial Framework through which the EU is funded, the 
establishment of a European External Action Service, and certain treaty amendments.”14 
The ordinary legislative procedure also works to ensure compliance and accountability 
between the EU’s institutions.  The European Parliament also has the power to “request 
the commission to submit any appropriate proposal on matters on which it considers 
that a Union act is required for the purpose of implementing the Treaty.”15   
 
Despite significant advancements in the role of the European Parliament in the general 
affairs of the EU, Horspool & Humphrey succinctly summarise the so-called progress 
made by the European Parliament under the Treaty of Lisbon.  They state that “the EP is 
still far short of being a Parliament in the proper sense of word.  It has practically no 
legislative initiative and a right to reject legislation.”16  They continue to state that 
despite “being the only directly elected body in the Union, it still has difficulty in 
presenting itself as an effective representative of the peoples of Europe and this is 
reflected in the extremely low voter turnout at European Parliament elections.”17 The 
results of low voter turnout problem highlights the difficulty of the European 
Parliament presenting itself as representative of the peoples of Europe.   This affirms 
the need for the existence, and the ability of the ‘peoples of Europe’ to exercise 
constituent power over those governing institutions. 
 
C. The European Commission 
The Commission is given legal personality under Article 17 TEU.  The Treaty of Lisbon 
establishes that the Commission is responsible for the co-ordination, execution and 
administrative functions of the EU.  Specifically, the Commission “shall promote the 
general interest of the Union and take appropriate initiatives to that end.”18 While a 
common criticism of the Commission is that it is “[p]ower-hungry and … single-
                                                        
13 Ibid. 
14 ‘Understanding the Treaty of Lisbon’ Above, n 26 at 17. 
15 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Article 225(2). 
16 M Horspool & M Humphreys European Union Law (7th ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012) at 60. 
17 Ibid. 
18 TEU, Art 17(1). 
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mindedly pursues the integration of Europe along ‘supranational’ or federalist lines.”19 
The Treaty of Lisbon works to ensure a Commission exists that works more co-
operatively with Member States and other instituions of the EU. 
 
There are currently 28 Commissioners, one from each EU Member State. Traditionally, 
Commissioners are likely to have been members of their national parliaments and are 
selected by the head of their State’s government.  Despite Commissioners being 
politicians, rather than civil servants,  the Commissioners must exercise their duties, 
and the duty of the Commission generally, completely impartially from the influence of 
any Member State and its members “shall be chosen on the grounds of their general 
competence and European commitment from persons whose independence is beyond 
doubt.”20  Article 17(3) further requires that members of the Commission “shall neither 
seek nor take instructions from any government or other institution[.]”21 
 
D. Powers and Functions of the European Commission 
The primary function of the Commission is to ensure the general interest of the Union, 
and application of the Treaties is adhered to.  Article 258 TFEU provides that where the 
Commission considers that a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations under the 
Treaties, the Commission as the power to effectively require the Member State to 
explain why this situation has occurred. This supervisory power is supported by 
extensive enforcement powers.  Where a Member State fails to comply with an 
obligation under the Treaties, the Commission “may bring the matter before the Court 
of Justice of the European Union.”22 
 
The second function of the Commission, is to act as the executive branch of the EU. This 
sentiment is widely accepted, but is “misleading outside some quite narrow areas, 
mainly connected to the expenditure of the EU’s budget, which is small in relation to the 
budgets of the [M]ember [S]tates, [but] has to operate within strict parameters set by 
                                                        
19 D G. Dimitrakopoulos and H Kassim, ‘Inside the European Commission: Preference Formation and the 
Convention on the Future of Europe’, Comparative European Politics, 2005, 3 at 182. 
20 TEU, Art 17(3). 
21 Ibid. 
22 TFEU, Art 258. 
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the Council of Ministers and the Parliament.”23 The Commission is also responsible for 
representing the EU at the international level in the EU’s relations with other states. 
 
The Commission, together with the Council and the European Parliament, plays a vital 
role in the law-making process at the EU level.  The Commission has the important 
power of initiating legilsation.  Article 289 TFEU states that the “ordinary legislative 
procedure shall consist in the joint adoption by the European Parliament and the 
Council of a regulation, directive or decision on a proposal from the Commission[.]”24 
While the legislative process of the EU requires a consultative process, the Commission 
is responsible for “drawing up a proposal on what they want to legislate, [consistent 
with] three constant objectives: to identify the European interest, to seek advice on 
what is necessary and to respect the principle of subsidia[rity].”25 After a proposal has 
been initiated the Commission will continue to have significant input as the proposal 
works its way through the legislative process. 
 
The ordinary legislative process increases the involvement and co-operation that must 
take place between the Commission and the European Parliament, as required by 
Article 294 of the TFEU. It retains significant powers to initiate legislation, but as a 
result of the reforms of the Treaty of Lisbon, it must work with greater co-operation 
with the other institutions of the EU.  
 
E. The Council of the European Union  
The Council is the primary legislative arm of the EU.  Originally known as the Council of 
Ministers, it is now ‘the Council of the European Union’.  Article 31 TEU gives the 
Council  the power of “taking the final decision on, and of carrying out, the proposals 
submitted by the Commission under the TEU and the TFEU.”26 While one body, the 
Council’s configration and membership depends on the matter that is the subject of 
discussion, whether it be agriculture, finance, environment, and so on.    
                                                        
23 Author Unknown, ‘EU Constitution and institutions’, EIU ViewsWire, 
<search.proquest.com/docview/466518114?accountid=14782>. 
24 TFEU, Art 289. 
25 D Vataman, ‘Decision Making Process in the European Union after entry into force of the Treaty of 
Lisbon,’ Institutional law of the European Union, Bucharest, Universul Jurdic Publishing House, 2010, p. 
179 at 182. 
26 Above, n 15 at 38. 
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The Council consists of representatives of Member States at ministerial level, who have 
the authority to “commit the government of the Member State in question and cast its 
vote.”27 Traditionally, meetings of the Council of the European Union were traditionally 
not public, “and the secrecy of the deliberations has been the subject of much criticism, 
viewing this as a contributing factor to the democratic deficit in the Union.”28  
 
As the primary legislative body of the EU, the voting procedures the Council of the 
European Union are important to understand how decisions are made at the EU level.  
The Treaty of Lisbon states that decisions of the Council of the European Union shall be 
made “by a qualified majority.”29 From November 2014, the qualified majority vote is 
defined as “at least 55 % of the members of the Council, comprising at least fifteen of 
them and representing Member States comprising at least 65 % of the popoulation of 
the Union.”  In addition, Article 16(8) TEU requires that at Council meetings when the 
Council deliberates and votes on a daft legislative act, these meetings are made public.  
 
III. THE CONSTITUIONAL BASIS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION  
As it will have become apparent, a number of treaties represent the constitutional basis 
of the EU.  In the aftermath of World War Two, The Treaty of Paris established the 
European Coal and Steal Community (ECSC).  The ECSC brought together France, 
Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries (Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxembourg) 
together to ensure the free movement of coal and steel, and to prevent the possibility of 
war occurring.  The aim of this Treaty through the ECSC was to “contribute to economic 
expansion, the development of employment and the improvement of the standard of 
living[.]”30  The founders of the ECSC recognised that only through increased economic 
co-operation and integration, there would be less desire, and possibility for the Member 
States to go to war with each other.   
 
To ensure compliance with the Treaty, a number of supranational institutions were 
established.  These institutions were the High Authority, a Common Assembly, a Special 
                                                        
27 TEU, Art 16(2). 
28 Above, n 15 at 39. 
29 TEU, Art 16(3). 
30 Treaty of Paris, Art 2, adopted 1951, entered into force 1952. 
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Council of Ministers and a Court of Justice.31  Principally, the High Authority was 
designated with the power and responsibility “for assuring the fulfilment of the 
purposes stated in the … Treaty[.]”32  The High Authority had supranational powers, 
which were to be exercised independently of any influence or persuasion by the 
Member States.   
 
The success of the ECSC demonstrated that wider European integration was possible. 
Therefore, further economic co-operation was decided necessary. In response to the 
desire for greater integration, the Treaty of Rome, signed in 1957, established the 
European Economic Community (EEC).  The EEC provided the institutional framework 
for what would later become the EU.  Integration and development continued 
throughout the 20th century with a number of Treaties designed to increase the powers 
of the European Community in order to achieve the original goals of the Treaty of Rome, 
of greater European economic co-operation.  
 
While the history of the EU provides valuable insight into the EU’s existing 
constitutional arrangements, for the purposes of this discussion, the primary focus is 
upon the current governing treaty, the Treaty of Lisbon.33  It is also necessary to 
examine why the Treaty of Lisbon was necessary, particulary the failure of the 
European Union to institute a Constitution for Europe. 
 
The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe proposed in 2003, and agreed to by 
the Heads of State or Government of the Member States in October 200434 was driven 
by the desire of closer integration, and a need to simplify the governing structure of the 
EU.  This need was clearly evident when considering that the “texts of the various EU’s 
agreed treaties and the laws derived from them, the acquis communautair, [ran] to a 
total of 20,000 pages.”35  In response to this arguably excessive volume of laws and 
regulations, the Constitution for Europe was to be “a clear statement of what the EU is 
and what it does, as well as fixing some glaring institutional problems.”36  
                                                        
31 TEU, Art 7. 
32 TEU, Art 8. 
33 Above, n 1. 
34 Official Journal of the European Union 2004 No L 310. 
35 R Tiersky, “The EU Constitution: How Significant?” Headline Series 326 (2004) at 46. 
36 Ibid.  
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The foundation of the Draft Constitutional Treaty followed the principle need to reform 
the very institutional basis of the EU.  It would put on paper “a simplified, more or less 
decision-making structure for the EU, finally clarifying the division of powers between 
the national governments and the EU institutions.”37  However, despite its aspirational 
nature and straightforward purpose, citizens in France and the Netherlands rejected the 
Draft Constitutional Treaty’s adoption in referendas conducted by those countries 
governments in 2005.  Following these rejections, in conjunction with the unratified 
status of the Treaty in a number of other Member States, it became clear that a unique 
constitutional crisis was occurring in the EU.  The rejection by the French and Dutch 
citizens sent a clear message that European citizens did not share the same desire as EU 
governments and leaders that the desire to adopt a ‘European Constitution’.  It is 
suggested that one of the primary reasons for the ‘no’ votes by the Dutch and French 
citizens resulted out of a fear that “by a Constitution of Europe their national 
constitutions would be overruled, [and] the European Union would become a super-
state.”38 
 
In response to the constitutional crisis EU leaders returned to the traditional reform 
approach of amending the existing treaties.  The outcome of the re-negotiations was the 
“Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing 
the European Community.”39 
 
Initially referred to as the Reform Treaty, the Treaty of Lisbon “largely reproduces the 
Constitutional Treaty, but has done away with all the elements which gave [the] draft 
treaty the character of a constitution.”40  Importantly, this decision to do away with all 
elements of the Draft Constitutional Treaty represents a clear rejection by the Member 
States to take the symbolic step towards integration, by agreeing to be bound to a 
‘European Constitution’.   
 
                                                        
37 Tiersky, above n 25 at 48. 
38 R Streinz, München, ‘The European Constitution after the Failure of the Constitutional Treaty’ ZÖR 63 
(2008), 159-187 at 170. 
39 Official Journal of the European Union 2007 No C 306/1 (herein after referred to as the Treaty of 
Lisbon). 
40 Above, n 16 at 18. 
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The Treaty of Lisbon’s purpose is to make the EU “more democratic, more efficient and 
better able to address global problems … with one voice.”41  It also clarifies the division 
of powers between the EU, Member States, and what powers are shared.  The Treaty of 
Lisbon is divided into the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).  All references to the former three-pillar 
structure of the European Community were abolished, and references to the term ‘law’ 
were removed when referring to decisions of the European Law.  
 
The TEU and TFEU sets out the legal powers and competencies of the European Union.  
Similar to a constitution that sets out the legal structure of a domestic legal system, the 
TEU codifies the institutions of the EU, while the TFEU provides the legal basis for these 
institutions to act.  The TEU “marks a new stage in the process of creating an ever closer 
union among the peoples of Europe, in which decisions are taken as openly as possible 
and as closely as possible to the citizen.”42  Article 1 reinforces the EU’s commitment to 
increased participation of European citizens in the governing of the EU.  To complement 
the legal basis of the EU, Article 1 TFEU “determines the areas of, delimitation of, and 
arrangements for exercising [the EU’s] competences.”  Together, the TFEU “and the 
Treaty on European Union constitute the Treaties on which the Union is founded.”43 The 
Treaty of Lisbon reformed and reordered these two treaties, providing the 
constitutional and institutional basis of the EU.  
 
F. The Origins of Constituent Power  
 Constituent power, and specifically constituent power in the EU, is central to this 
discussion.  Joel Colón-Ríos helpfully provides a succinct definition of what constituent 
power is.  Principally, “[c]onstituent power means constitution-making power, the 
source of production of fundamental juridical norms.”44  Constituent power is crucial in 
order to establish legitimate constituted powers, which are the “legal and political 
institutions created by the constituent subject.”45  For the EU where the principles of 
                                                        
41 EU Law, Treaties, < www.europa.eu/eu-law/decision-making/treaties/index_en.htm>. 
42 TEU, Art 1. 
43 TFEU, Art 1. 
44 J L. Colón-Ríos ‘Carl Schmitt and Constituent Power in Latin American Courts: The Cases of Venezuela 
and Colombia’ Constellations 18:3, 2011 at 366. 
45 Ibid. 
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democracy and the rule of law are fundamental and are enshrined as fundamental in its 
legal framework, the idea of constituent power is conspicuously absent.  
 
There is significant discussion and debate about the impact and influence of constituent 
power on constitutions and democracy generally.  However, what is clear is that despite 
any attempt to enshrine and codify a constitution as being unable to be altered or 
replaced, there is always the possibility for this to occur, as constituent power sits 
above any constitution or sovereign authority. 
 
Furthermore, constituent power “is the political will, whose power or authority is cable 
of making the concrete, comprehensive decision of the type and form of its own political 
existence.”46  Furthermore, “constituent power is seen as a legally unlimited power, a 
power that assumes the constitutional regime as radically open.”47  The theory of 
constituent power argues that citizens of a sovereign state have the power to create and 
adopt the fundamental rules that govern them. It further argues that the constituent 
power of the people can never be limited or derogated from.  
 
Dependent on two important conditions, constituent power requires “recognition that 
the ultimate source of political authority derives from an entity known as ‘the people’ 
and acceptance of the idea of a constitution as something that is created.”48 To a 
significant extent the theory of constituent power arguably sits well within the EU’s 
fundamental principles of respect for democracy and the rule of law. However, the 
applicability of constituent power, and the possibility for it to be exercised, depends 
upon the existence of a single unified constituent base of citizens. Crucially, it also 
requires a single constitutional basis that applies universally to those who have agreed 
to be bound by it. 
 
Carl Schmitt, arguably one of the leading theorists on constituent power, attempted to 
describe the relationship between constituent power and constitutions. Schmitt stated 
                                                        
46 C Schmitt Constitutional Theory (Duke University Press, Durham and London, 2008) at 125. 
47 J L. Colón-Ríos Weak Constitutionalism Democratic legitimacy and the question of constituent power (ed, 
Routledge, Abingdon, 2012) at 7. 
48 Martin Loughlin ‘The concept of constituent power’ European Journal of Political Theory 2014, Vol. 
13(2) 218-237 at 219. 
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that constituent power is an expression of political will “capable of making the concrete, 
comprehensive decision over the type and form of its own political existence.”49  
Schmitt argued that this constituent power is inherently different from any changes that 
could be made by a government or legislature.  
 
Any constitution that exists is “an expression of the constituent power of the people to 
make and re-make the institutional arrangements through which they are governed.”50 
This expression of constituent power, can also be expressed to mean that the 
‘constituted power’ is the power vested in an authority to rule, or govern, while the 
‘constituent power’ is “the power through which the prince’s power to rule was 
authorized.”51  By dividing constituent power in this way, it is clear that constituent 
power is a fundamental principle that is arguably greater than any constitution and has 
the power to amend or replace constitutions that are often described as entrenched and 
beyond normal legislative amendment. 
 
Most formulations of constituent power are considered only in the context of a domestic 
legal order.  The question remains, if the ability to fundamentally alter and replace a 
constitution is held by ‘the people’ at the domestic level, in what form does constituent 
power exist at the EU level, and who holds that power.  
 
As has been discussed, the EU is founded on treaty law.  If the EU wishes to undertake 
any action, that action must be provided for in its governing treaties.  Anything that is 
not within the scope of the EU remains with Member States.  To initiate constituent 
power, Schmitt details a number of scenarios whereby ‘the people’ have the ability to 
reorganise the constitutional make-up of the institutions that govern them.  
Importantly, Schmitt states that ‘[t]here cannot be a regulated procedure, through 
which the activity of the constitution-making power would be bound’52.  Such a 
statement sits in conflict with the fundamental structure of the EU, where no action is 
capable of being undertaken unless it is expressly provided for in the treaties.  
 
                                                        
49 Carl Schmitt Constitutional Theory (Duke University Press, Durham, 2008) at 125. 
50 Above, n 39 at 219. 
51 Above, n 39 at 220. 
52 Above n 39. 
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Constituent power, as the exercise of constitution-making power by the constituent 
body, is crucial to the fundamental democratic make-up of a sovereign democratic state.  
However, constituent power is arguably more difficult to apply at the EU level.  The 
exercise of power is strictly defined in the Treaty of Lisbon, through the institutions of 
the EU.  It is necessary to examine the explicit exercise of power in the EU by its 
institutions before questions of whether constituent power in the EU exists. 
 
G. The Court of Justice of the European Union 
After outlining the constitutional structure of the EU, it is necessary to discuss the 
primary institution that is responsible for for ensuring the uniform interpretation and 
application of EU law.   
 
While not involved in the legislative procedure of the Union like the Parliament, 
Commission and Council, it is necessary to discuss the the most important court of the 
European Union.  The Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) consists of the Court 
of Justice, the General Court and specialised courts.  These courts “shall ensure that in 
the interpretation and application of the Treaties the law is observed.”53 Article 19 gives 
to the ECJ the power to rule on actions brought by a Member State, an institution or a 
natural or legal person.   The ECJ is composed in a manner following the example of 
other institutions, such as the Commission.  Each Member State provides one judge to 
sit on the Bench. 
 
The ECJ has arguably made some of the most important contributions to the 
development of EU law. Through its case law, the ECJ has ruled that national 
adminstrations and courts must apply EU law in full in order to protect the rights of EU 
law conferred upon citizens. This is known as the principle of direct effect, and has 
significant influence on how the constitutional structure of the EU operates in its 
relationship with citizens of the Member States.  
 
In Case 26/62 NV Algemene Transport-en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend en Loos v 
Nederlandse Belastingad-ministratie (1963) (van Gend en Loos).  The case itself 
concerned a reclassification of a product for purposes of customs duties imported into 
                                                        
53 TEU, Art 19(1). 
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the Netherlands.  The result of this reclassficiation was that a higher customs duty was 
imposed by the Netherlands.  At that time, Article 12 of the European Economic 
Community (EEC) Treaty stated that any existing customs duties that existed must be 
removed.  In refering the case to the ECJ, the national court asked “did Article 12 [of the 
existing EEC Treaty] have direct application within the territory of a Member State … 
meaning … could nationals of such a Member State on the basis of the Article lay claim 
to individual rights which the court must protect.”54 In the case, the Netherlands 
Government disputed whether an alleged infringement of the Treaty by a Member State 
could be submitted for judgment by someone other than the European Commission or 
another Member State.  In reply, the ECJ held that “Article 12 is applicable without any 
preliminary incorporation in the national legislation of Member States [and] it has 
direct effect without any further measures of implementation under Community 
legislation[.]55 The Court continued to state that  
“[T]he Community constitutes a new legal order of international law for the benefit of which the 
states have limited their sovereign rights … and the subjects of which comprise not only Member 
States but also their nationals.  Independently of the legislation of Member States, Community 
law therefore not only imposes obligations on individuals but is intended to confer upon them 
rights which become part of their legal heritage[.]”56 
This statement, and the decision in Van Gend en Loos generally, clarified the legal 
situation for the Member States of the EEC. Importantly, it set out the crtieria for the 
direct effect of Treaty articles to be implemented on Member States. The ECJ required 
that Treaty articles had to be “clear, uncondititonal and not subject to further 
implementation.”57 This principle of direct effect plays a vital role in ensuring that EU 
law is applied uniformly throughout the Member States.  
 
The ECJ also has a vital role to play in the uniform application of EU law throughout 
Member States.  The principle of direct effect is summarised to mean that “[l]egally, 
direct effect construes mutual obligations among memberr states as rights owed by 
states to individuals which national courts must protect.”58 Here Weiler highlights the 
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role that individuals play in the EU, and the disparity of power and influence that exists 
between individuals and the institutions.  
 
With greater analysis, it becomes clear that the EU is a large entity with many actors 
seeking to exercise the greatest amount of influence in the decision-making process.  
Now that the key institutions of the EU have been described, as well as outlining the 
constitutional structure of the EU, it is necessary to discuss the EU’s legal system. 
 
H. The Union Legal System 
For the purposes of this discussion, focus of the EU’s legal system will largely remain 
with the legislative procedures, as these procedures arguably have the most direct 
impact upon the citizens of the EU. 
 
As it should be clear, the EU does not have a single source of law, and no single 
constitutional base. Despite the various institutions having significantly large scope to 
carry out the functions of the EU, everything the institutions can do do is limited by the 
governing treaties.  However, thanks to reforms made under the Treaty of Lisbon “[t]he 
EU is defined by the treaties and what it does.”59 Furthermore, the  “treaties show the 
EU to be a legalistic affair, subject to rules and guidelines about operation, principles 
and relationships, not an untrammelled super-state.”60 The EU may only act where 
power has been attributed to it through the legal texts. This is the principle of conferral 
and it is codified under Articles 4 and 5 of the TEU. 
 
Article 4 specifies that “competences not conferred upon the Union in the Treaties 
remain with the Member States.”61 EU powers are further limited by the Member States 
under Article 5(2) which states “[u]nder the principle of conferral, the Union shall act 
only within the limits of the competences conferred upon it by the Member States in the 
Treaties to attain the objectives set out therin. Competences not conferred upon the 
Union in the Treaties remain with the Member States.” 
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EU legislation, as I have described, is primarily passed by the Council and the European 
Parliament acting on a proposal by the Commission.  This is done through the ordinary 
legislative procedure.  The implementation of EU law varies and depends on what type 
of legislative act is chosen by an institution to achieve a legislative goal.  EU law, like 
domestic law can be made through primary or secondary legislation.  Primary law 
making power comes from the EU’s constitutive treaties, the TEU and TFEU. A key 
aspect of the TFEU is that it governs how legislation is adopted by the institutions of the 
EU. When exercising the competences of the EU, Article 288 provides for three binding, 
and two non-binding legislative acts.  These legislative acts are “regulations, directives, 
decisions, recommendations and opinions.”62  Through these acts, the EU is able to 
institute its policy and achieve its objectives under the TEU and TFEU.  
 
I. Democracy – Participatory Democracy or a Democratic Deficit  
So far, this paper has focused primarily on providing an outline of key EU institutions 
and its constitutional and legal framework. While these are important, notably absent 
has been any discussion on the involvement and participation of European citizens. The 
EU boldly affirms its commitment to democracy and the rights of European citizens in 
the first three Articles of the TEU. Under Article 1, TEU that “[t]his Treaty marks a new 
stage in the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe.” This 
every closer union is “founded on values of respect for human dignity, freedom, 
democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights.” Article 3 provides 
that the Union’s aim “is to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples.” 
On reading these opening Articles, it could be assumed that citizens are at the heart of 
the EU in every respect. However, citizen involvement in the functioning of the EU 
remains extremely limited.   
 
The following section will discuss what has been termed the democratic deficit of the 
EU and in what form ‘democracy’ can be held to exist in the EU. Primarily that citizen’s 
lack the ability to influence change over the instutions that govern them. In response to 
this perception, the EU has taken various steps through its development and transition 
into a more participatory democracy including the reforms brought in through the 
Treaty of Lisbon, and the principle of subsidiarity. I will seek to identify to what extent 
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the EU represents a modern liberal democracy, and whether it has succeeded in fully 
engaging with the citizens of the EU. 
 
J. The Democratic Deficit  
Democratic states and regimes “are more likely to endure and flourish where a balanced 
equilibrium exists between citizens’ aspirations for democracy … and its perceieved 
supply.”63 Critically for the EU, this gap between citizens’ aspirations for democracy and 
the supply of that democracy originated as a result of the EU’s constitutional and 
institutional framework placing more power in unelected and appointed instutitons 
instead of those elected by citizens. Furthermore, “the core decision-making 
instututions in the EU have been regarded … as falling well short of the standards of 
democratic accountability and transparency that exists at the national level within each 
of the member states.”64 This idea of the democratic deficit matters because where 
there is a perceived lack of involvement by the citizens in their governing institutions it 
can indicate “pervasive doubts about the role and powers of government.”65 When 
viewed in consideration of the fact that the EU’s principle treaties, the TEU and TFEU 
place such value on the importance of the individual citizen, it is difficult to understand 
why there is such a disparity of influence between the citizens and the institutions. 
However, it is easy to determine that if this is the situation, why disengagement 
between citizens and the EU institutions exists. 
 
Despite lacking significant aspects of participatory democracy, the EU arguably 
undergoes a constant progression towards becoming a more democratic organisation 
that is “inspired by traditional institutions from national constitutionalism.”66 However, 
as it has been established,  the only directly representative body of the EU, the European 
Parliament is relatively weak and “has been considered as the main cause of the EU’s 
democratic deficit.”67 While treaty reforms have aimed at reducing this deficit and 
increasing the powers of the European Parliament in the law-making process, the 
participation of citizens remains extremely weak.  Participation as a democratic value is 
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important because it “enables individuals to rise about their private existence and 
become emancipated citizens … more attentive to the interests of others, and more 
probing of their own interests.”68  Furthermore, [p]articipatory democracy implies 
information, communication and engagement within the relationship between 
adminstration and citizens.”69 This type of democracy is considered to be one “which 
allows citizens to actively play a part within a decision-making process.”70 Participatory 
democracy is essential in order to ensure the legitimacy of the EU’s institutions are 
maintained.   
 
K. The Subsidiarity Principle – Checks and Balances upon the EU’s power 
An important way in which the EU has attempted to address the issue of the democratic 
deficit is through the principles of subsidiatiry and proportionality. The principle of 
subsidiarity creates the limits that the Member States have placed upon EU institutions 
exercise of power.  Subsidiarity was first included in EU treaty law in the Treaty of 
Maastricht, which was signed in 1992.  The purpose and role of subsidiarity was 
introduced “as a mechanism for alleviating disputes concerning the division of 
competence between the [European Community] and the Member States.”71 Through 
the subsidiarity principle, Member States concerns about the expansion of the European 
Community into areas where the Member States had not ceded authority to the 
Community’s institutions to act.  Importantly, “it was felt that subsidiarity would help 
prevent excessive use of power by Brussels.”72 This sentiment, expressed by the 
Member States at Maastricht, provides a strong indication of the reluctance by the 
Member States to accept excessive overreaching of the European Community into areas 
not explicitly within the Community’s competencies.    
 
Subsidiarity, as introduced under the Maastricht Treaty was the Member States key 
method for “allaying fears about the ‘F’ word (federalism).”73 The fear of federalism and 
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the EU becoming a federal state has led to the continuation of subsidiarity under the 
Treaty of Lisbon.  The subsidiarity principle is of central importance and is given 
prominence in the TEU under Article 5(3). It states: 
Under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within its exclusive 
competence, the Union shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action 
cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at central level or at regional 
and local level, but can rather, by reason of scale or effects of the proposed action, be better 
achieved at the Union level. 
Article 5(3) emphasises that the EU will only act when it is can be reasonably argued 
that action at the EU level would achieve the most effective and beneficial outcome.   
Protocol (No 2) sets out the specific application of the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality.  
 
The Protocol’s preamble sets out the objectives of subsidiarity and proportionality, 
which is “to ensure that decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizens  of the 
Union.”74 When deciding whether to take action, article 5 of Protocol 2 requires that 
‘[a]ny draft legislative act should contain a detailed statement making it possible to 
appraise compliance with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.” This 
means that any legislative action taken by the EU must be first justified as necessary and 
compliant with the subsidiarity and proportionality requirements of the TEU.  
 
Subsidiarity and proportionality are effective means of providing checks and balances 
on the EU institutions. They ensure that where a decision for a proposed action is put 
forward by an EU institution, the elected representative bodies of Member States have 
the opportunity to provide feedback on the proposed legislative action.  Protocol 2 helps 
to increase the democratic legitimacy of proposed EU action by requiring that “the 
Commission shall consult widely.”75 The Protocol gives to national parliaments the 
opportunity to submit to the legislative institutions of the EU (the European Parliament, 
Council, and the Commission) that Parliament’s “reasoned opinion stating why it 
considers that the draft … does not comply with the principle of subsidiarity.”76 While 
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not perfect, subsidiarity provides a further, although indirect, way of achieving greater 
participation of European citizens in the EU’s legislative process.  
 
L. Committee of the Regions  
The Committee of the Regions (the Committee) was another innovation under the 
Maastricht Treaty with the intent of creating an EU that was built on representative 
democracy and accountability of its institutions.  The Commission was a strong 
advocate for the establishment of the Committee as it “tried to find a way to increase the 
legitmacy of the policy-making process in the EU.”77 By establishing a regional 
representative body, “[g]iving the subnational level of government direct access to EU 
policy making seemed to be a feasible solution for regaining the trust and interest of the 
citizens.”78 Articles 305 – 307 of the TFEU sets out the role of the Committee, and states 
that the Committee be consulted by the European Parliament, the Council, or the 
Commission “where the Treaties so provide”79 and in any case “which one of these 
institutions considers it appropriate.”80 The Committee acts primarily as an advisory 
body to the EU institutions representing the the opinions of local and regional bodies. 
 
The Committee’s Mission Statement provides a useful insight into the overall objectives 
that it identifies as important, and areas where its input is required. It’s mission is “to 
involve regional and local authorities in the European decision-making process and thus 
to encourage greater participation from [its] fellow citizens.”81 This statement 
reinforces the role of the Committee as set out under the TFEU. The Committee further 
affirms its goals by stating that its members “are ambassadors of Europe in the regions, 
cities and municipalities and speak for them in the European debate.”82 The Mission 
Statement continues to affirm the Committee’s role as the best placed institution to 
effectively represent European citizens. It concludes by acknowleding the members 
position as locally elected politicians and that it has “a direct dialouge with … fellow 
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citizens on Europe’s achievements and challenges.”83 Throughout the Mission 
Statement, the Committee recognises its role as a facilitator of communication between 
the main EU institutions and the citizens.  This suggests that it sees itself as the best 
institution for this role.  
 
However, despite the various EU institutions best efforts, and those of the members of 
the Committee, it has “neither become a regional representative chamber with full 
rights nor has it followed the institutional model based on the example [of other 
committees].”84 Despite criticisms of the Committees’ ability to influence the policy-
making process of the EU, when assessing the effectiveness of the Committee, there are 
three questions that are relevant. Firstly, how effectively does the Committee perform 
its representative functions? Secondly, how effectively does the Committee perform its 
advisory functions? Thirdly, how effectively does the Committee perform its symbolic 
functions? 
 
M. Committee of the Regions - Representation 
Membership of the Committee is allocated proportionally to each Member State based 
roughly on size. Its composition “relates directly to the representative function of the 
[Committee].”85 Under the Treaty of Nice, the EU agreed that members of the committee 
must be “representative of regional and local bodies who either hold a regional or local 
authority electoral mandate or are politically accountable to an elected assembly.”86 
(This provision was translated into Article 300 of the TFEU). The Committee has 353 
members who are regional presidents, mayors or elected representatives of regions and 
cities throughout the EU’s Member States.  The Committee initially was granted very 
limited scope to exercise its functions but has gradually seen its role in the EU, and 
ability to fulfill its objectives expanded. 
 
In this way, the Committee provides an institutional representation of the principle of 
subsidiarity.  Through representing the regions, and local authorities, the Committee is 
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arguably the best placed organisation to provide advice to the other EU institutions on 
the matters that affect European citizens the most.  However, Member States prove to 
be reluctant to give the Committee greater autonomy and the ability to act on its own 
initiative except in very limited circumstances.  
 
N. Committee of the Regions – an Advisory Body 
The Committees advisory functions relate closely to its role as ‘guardian’ of the principle  
of subsidiarity.  In order to provide advice to the main EU instituions on legislative 
matters, the Committee has created six commissions  “for the purpose of writing 
opinions.”87 The commissions cover all aspects of policy area that the Committee 
considers it should have input in.  These commissions “examine documents issued by 
the Council, the Commission or the Parliament.”88 The opinions produced by the 
commissions “enable the European Union to benefit from the experience of COR 
members at local or regional level.”89 However, for the Committee to function as an 
effective advisory body, it relies significantly on the co-operation of the other EU 
institutions to consider its opnions.   
 
The Committee’s advisory function is strengthened by its ability to bring actions to the 
ECJ where it believes the principle of subisidiarity has been infringed. Protocol 2 
provides grants jursidiction to the ECJ in actions “on grounds of infringment of the 
principle of subsidiarity by a legislative act.”90 Article 8 further states that in areas 
where the TFEU provides that the Committee is consulted, “the Committee of the 
Regions may also bring such actions[.]”91 This ability to bring an action helps to ensure 
that its opinions are given appropriate consideration by the other EU institutions.  
 
O. Committee of the Regions – Symbolic Functions  
A final way in order to measure the effectiveness of the Committee is to assess how well 
it fulfills its symbolic functions. As noted, the Committee was created to the idea that the 
EU was built on the principle of representative democracy and there was a direct way to 
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ensure accountability of its institutions.  In order to combat the overreach of Brussels 
into the sovereignty of Member States, subsidiarity is seen as “an assertion of the 
sovereignty of national governments against the supranational powers of Brussels.”92 
Increasingly, “[d]ecisions fundamentally affecting the people’s lives … were made … by 
their national governments without consulting them, while the powers to take these 
decisions were transferred … to European Commissioners … who were not 
democratically accountable.”93 The EU’s response to create the Committee  was its 
attempt to address this perceived democratic deficit that existed in the EU. The Treaty 
of Lisbon’s reforms that have expanded the Committee’s power to provide advice and 
monitor other institutions’ compliance with the principles of subsidiarity function 
provide a significant way to help the EU maintain its democratic legitimacy.  
 
For the Committee to effectively represent the local and regional interests of citizens at 
the EU level, it must be perceived by the other institutions, the Commission, European 
Parliament, and Council of Ministers, as a significant body in its own right. If the 
institutions do include Committee opinions into the legislative process, it is possible “to 
conclude that the local and regional dimension is included … in EU policy making and 
implementation.”94 The Committee has the ability to play a central role in policy making 
process and to make the connection between European citizens and the EU institutions, 
often perceived to be extremely tenuous.  
 
The focus of the Committee is on involving European citizens in the decision-making 
process of the EU.  This desire to involve citizens is seen throughout the EU’s 
institutions objectives and in the governing treaties.  It is clear that despite several 
measures to involve citizens in the governing process, the primary actors within the EU 
are the member states.  As a result of the Committee’s membership being made up of 
directly-elected representatives, the Committee “prefers a normative discourse on 
subsidiarity, proximity, partnership and closeness to the people[,]”95 as opposed to 
talking about participatory democracy in a strictly theoretical sense. Resulting from the 
                                                        
92 Above n 84, at 348. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Above n 84 at 353. 
95 A A. Luksic and M Bahor, “Participatory Democracy within the EU: A Solution For Democratic Gap” 
Journal of Comparative Politics, (Vol 3, No 2, July 2010) at 92. 
James Gallagher 
 27 
Committee’s membership, it arguably gives it as an institution with an electoral 
mandate and has the ability to “claim the importance of representative democracy”96 
while in contrast “non-elected political actors like the Commission … may search for 
alternative or complementary sources of legitimacy in civil society involvement.”97  The 
Commission continues to emphasise the importance of citizen involvement in the 
decision and policy-making process, by attempting to institutionalise political 
participation.  Despite this, any form of instituionalised participation, other than direct 
participatory democracy will arguably be unable to address the criticisms relating to the 
democractic deficit.  
 
However, for the EU as a whole, trying to establish itself as a supranational organisation 
with all the appearances of a national federal organisation, it crucially lacks one 
important factor.   The EU fails to create one united group of EU citizens.  In order for 
the theory of constituent power to apply at the EU level, it is necessary for a single 
constituent group to exist in order to exercise the constituent power over the EU.  I will 
now discuss the ways in which the EU has attempted to create this concept of the 
European citizen, and how processes are in place that could help European citizens 
exercise constituent power over the EU. 
 
IV. CREATING A EUROPEAN CITIZEN 
While the EU has undergone significant reforms in strengthening its democratic 
cedibility, this has arguably only extended it in the area of representative democracy.  
The EU lacked significant aspects of representative democracy.  In an attempt to solve 
this issue, the Treaty of Lisbon introduced one of its more important reforms (in terms 
of citizen participation), the European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI).  In order to fully explain 
the ECI, I will first look at the ECI’s legal basis, before explaining the processes and how 
the ECI works.  I will then look at what it means for democracy in the EU and how it 
represents a step towards creating a ‘European citizenary’. I will then assess whether 
the ECI could lead to constituent power being exercised by European citizens.  
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The concept of individual European citizens must be established and recognised, before 
any attempt for the citizens to exercise constituent power over the EU can be made.  
European citizens, as the constituent subject of the EU, could arguably possess greater 
power to amend the framework of the Member States.   This is because in a democracy 
“the legitimacy of the constitutent depends on it being the expression of a sovereign 
decision of the people, because a democracy only recogni[s]es the entire citzenry as the 
proper bearer of constituent power.”98 The EU has established various methods for 
engaging citizen participation in order to increase its democratic legitimacy, and 
includes the concept of ‘European citizenship’.   The Treaty of Maastricht99 introduced 
European  citizenship and held that “[e]very person holding the nationality of a Member 
State shall be a citizen of the Union.”100 The Treaty of Maastricht clearly sets out the 
rights and duties that are imposed upon Union citizens.  Rights and duties imposed 
include “the right to more and reside freely within the territory of Member States”101, 
and the “right to vote and to stand as a candidate at municipal elections in the Member 
State in which he resides, under the same conditions as nationals of that State.” 102 
Furthermore, the Treaty of Maastricht extended to Union citizens the entitlement of 
“protection by the diplomatic or consular authorities of any Member State, on the same 
conditions as the nationals of that State.”103 The Treaty also provides that every citizen 
of the Union “shall have the right to petition the European Parliament [and] may aply to 
the Ombudsman[.]”104 These rights afforded by the Treaty of Maastricht provide an 
important basis for the development of a Union citizen, by having common and 
indivisible rights afforded to all citizens whose countries are Member States of the EU. 
 
The concept of citizenship, whether in the EU context or generally, is a source of debate 
and contention.  While citizenship “remains a contested concept,  … one understanding 
of citizenship emerged from [W]estern Europe[:] a homogeneous poltiical status within 
the context of a state.”105 Using this understanding of citizenship, there are two 
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important aspects that create the concept of citizenship. Firstly, a homogeneous 
political status, and secondly, in the context of a state.   A homogeneous political status 
would be single citizenship resulting from being a member “of a legally uniform (usually 
naitonal) group of people, with attendant rights and duties.”106 This concept is 
challenged when attempting to apply it into the EU’s context because “the notion of an 
overarching EU citizenship is jarring as long as EU member states continue to exist as 
states and the EU itself is not a state.”107 In an attempt to limit the impact of growing EU 
influence, under the Treaty of Maastricht Member States sought to limit the importance 
attached to Union citizenship. The Member States did this by  ensuring that “nationality 
remain[ed] dependent on member state citizenship[.]”108  
 
For the EU to be a truly successful transnational democratic organisation with citizens 
interests at the heart of its actions, it needed to ensure that it had a system of 
universally applicable rights for all citizens of EU Member States.  Maastricht was the 
constitutional moment that created the concept of the ‘EU citizen’ but further work was 
needed to further solidify and codify the rights of the EU citizen.  The changes that the 
Maastricht Treaty introduced “unleashed a further flurry of debates and decisions in the 
ongoing process of creating European citizens.”109 Following further consolidation of 
the citizen concept by the Treaty of Nice, the European Parliament accurately described 
the exisiting state of European citizenship as “a dynamic institution, a key to the process 
of European integration [with the goal of] “gradually … supplement and extend the 
rights”110 of European’s national citizenship. The gradual extension of citizenship is 
crucial for the development of the creation of a unified constituent body.  
 
Extending the social rights of Europeans was identified as necessary for further 
fostering of a shared European identity. As a result of the limited EU budget allocated to 
it through Member States’ contributions, the EU supports European citizens’ rights 
through regulation of the implementation of these rights at the national level.  EU 
regulation in this field has been so effective and exceed the most advanced national 
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measures in the level of protection they afford, causing social rights activists to pursue a 
European rather than national strategy”111 because they expect European citizenship to 
provide a more effective resolution. EU social rights provide one of the most tangible 
examples of the benefits of European citizenship, and this has been supported by 
decisions in the Court of Justice of the European Union (then the European Court of 
Justice).   
 
The first decision, case C-85/96112, referred to the Court from the State of Bavaria asked 
whether a national of another Member State was entitled to a child-raising allowance. 
Originally, Maria Sala’s application was refused because she did not have German 
citizenship, a residence entitlement, or a residence permit. In response, the ECJ ruled 
that benefits granted to “persons fulfilling certain objective criteria … fall within the 
scope ratione materiae of Community Law as a family benefit within the meaning [of 
Community law.]”113 Furthermore, the ECJ ruled that “Community law precludes a 
Member State from requiring nationals of other Member States … to produce a formal 
residence permit … in order to receive a child-raising allowance.”114 This ruling is 
significant because it provided that regardless of national citizenship identity, the rights 
of the EU were applicable regardless of that citizen’s place of residence by virtue of their 
Union citizenship.  
 
The second case brought before the ECJ concerned a French citizen, Grzelcyk, who had 
moved to Belgium to study.115 Initially granted a student financial allowance, this was 
later refused “on the ground that the legal requirements for the grant of the [payment] 
… in particular the nationality requirement, had not been satisfied [because Grzelczyk] 
is an EEC national enrolled as a student.”116 As a result of the potential wide-reaching 
consequences the ECJ’s decision would have on Member States obligations, several 
Member States submitted to the Court different Government’s interpretation of Union 
law. The Belgian and Danish governments argued that despite the entry into force of the 
TEU and the Treaty of Amsterdam, “[c]itizenship of the Union does not mean that Union 
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citizens obtain rights that are new and more extensive than those already deriving from 
the EC Treaty … [and the] principle of citizenship of the Union has no autonomous 
content[.]117 Whereas the Portuguese Government stated that the rights introduced by 
the TEU, “nationals of the Member States acquired the status of citizens of the Union … 
[and the benefits provided to workers] ought also to be extended to all citizens of the 
Union, whether or not they are workers within the meaning of [Regulation No 
1612/68].”118 In response, the ECJ ruled that “Union citizenship is destined to be the 
fundamental status of nationals of the Member States [entitling them[ to enjoy the same 
treatment in law irrespective of their nationality[.]”119 The ECJ held that payment was 
required because if it was referred, would be contrary to the provisions of the freedom 
of movement for workers within the EU. Both the Sala and Grzelczyk decisions upheld 
the right to equal access to social benefits to anyone by virtue of their holding EU 
citizenship. As the experience of the ECSC demonstrated, closer economic relationships 
provided the basis for deeper political integration. So too through increased social 
rights of European citizens the EU’s institution provide a pathway for greater 
integration of citizens at the transnational level. 
 
P. Towards Greater Citizenship Rights and Powers 
Significant progress had been made in recognising Union citizens’ rights. The ways in 
which the EU has gradually increased the recognition of citizens within the overall EU 
policy and law-making framework has been highlighted.   This paper will now look at 
how citizens of the EU could arguably begin to exercise greater influence over EU 
institions and the legal process.  In his book, Bohman suggests ways in which the EU 
could undergo further reforms to make its transnational authority truly democratic. As 
a result of the rights and powers established in the Treaty of Maastricht, the “normative 
powers of EU citizens are constitutionally independent of their powers as citizens of 
member states.”120 Bohman argues that for the EU to gain greater democratic 
legitimacy, it would have to “reform itself in such a way as to create conditions for 
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deliberative and popular legitimacy [and would] cease to be merely a potentially 
innovative structural model and become an actual democratic political community.”121 
 
At the time of Bohman’s writing, the EU was in the middle of its constitutional 
discussions in response to the failed Draft Constitutional Treaty.  He argues that in 
constitutional democracies there are three different aspects of democratic legitimacy 
that form part of the constitution-making or constitutional change process. These three 
types of legitimacy work  The three types of legitmacy, suggested by Bohman are; 
formal legitimacy, popular legitimacy and deliberative legitimacy.  The formal 
legitimacy process of reform “is found in the institutional authority to initiate it, where 
this authority can be specifically delegated to some particular office or constitutionally 
specified in some expliciit amendment procedure.”122 Popular legitimacy is “the extent 
that the people have genuine opportunities to shape or assent to … reform.”123 Finally, 
democratic reform that maintains deliverative legitimacy offers citizens the opportunity 
to exert “an influence over the process of drafting the constitution or parts of a 
constitution.”124 These three forms of legitimacy represent various processes 
highlighting how constitutional change may take place, using democratic pre-existing 
concepts. They are important as they seek to explain how democratic  change may take 
place.  
 
Bohman examined the Draft Constitutional Treaty and found that the “proposed EU 
constitution codifies rather than improves the status quo and thus does not respond to 
the popular dissatisfaction with the current EU structure.”125 Despite being written 
before the reforms brought in under the Treaty of Lisbon, Bohman recognises the key 
difficulty of democratic constitutional reform in the EU “since there is not ‘People” that 
[the EU] is supposed to organize into a subject.”126 The lack of a unified subject, and 
effective representation for the subjects further compounds the difficulty of bringing 
about effective democratic reform. In response to this it was sugested that “the 
processes that form the popular will [should] be distributed across the various parts of 
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the constitutional structure.”127 The reforms of the Treaty of Lisbon went some way to 
reorganising the EU’s legislative structure, however the “challenge of democratic reform 
is that citizens have to appeal to normative powers that are not already constituted in 
some institutional structure.”128 In order for citizens to utilise the democratic authority 
and constituent power, “they must first appeal to their intrinsic democratic authority to 
recreate those institutions that constitute their normative powers in the first place.”129 
Bohman argues that only by doing this can citizens overcome institutional forms of 
domination.  The institutional structure of the EU requires Member States input in any 
Treaty reforms, but Boham proposed various ways in which EU citizens could become 
intrinsic in the legislative and constitutional process. It is clear the any form of 
democratic and institutional reform of EU law is a protracted process requiring many 
different steps, but by involving citizens can add a greater level of legitmacy to the EU’s 
institutions’ democratic claims. 
 
The EU in its current form provides a constitutional framework for accountability and 
its “explicit recognition of political rights as human rights invests all those affected by 
authoritative decisions with the normative powers and opportunities to exercise voice, 
including rights of participation.”130 As should be clear, the extent of participation is 
arguably quite limited but persistent reforms have sought to develop the level of 
European citizen participation. It is further suggested that “the main criterion for 
successful constitutionalization of the EU is whether or not it can democratize the 
transnational polity just as representative institutions previously democratized the 
constitutional state, by making its political agents more accountable and diverse.”131 
The EU requires a fundamental change from its current arrangement of delgated 
legislative authority and executive decision-making power.  
 
Q. Democratic Participation in the EU  
Throughout its establishment and constant reforms, the EU’s institutions have worked 
to create and solidify the notion of the European citizen.  Significant work has been done 
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in the areas of social and human rights that complement the EU’s free market principles.  
However, citizen’s political standing at the EU remains weak.  In response to this and 
the continuing problem of the alleged democratic deficit, each new treaty attempted to 
address this democratic deficit problem “by further empowering the European 
Parliament, first through direct elections and then gradually through increasing its 
legislative role until the Treaty of Lisbon 2009 made it a co-legislature[.]”132 As the only 
directly-elected Union institution, the European Parliament has a significant interest in 
ensuring that the views and opinions of citizens are as effective as possible in the 
governing of the EU. While the addition of the co-legislative procedure was a seen as a 
significant achievement for advancing the authority and power of the European 
Parliament, the Treaty of Lisbon provided for another form of participation that would 
allow European citizens to contribute and participate in the EU’s democratic life in an 
even more direct way than had previously been possible. 
 
R. Direct European Citizen Participation  
The execution of constituent power, as argued by Carl Schmitt, is “the transformation of 
the will of the constituent subject into law.”133 In order for the constituent subject to 
initiate the transformation of will into law, and the exercise of constituent power to take 
place, “something, some sort of political act(s), must occur that results in the initiation 
of constituent activity.”134 It is my argument that the inclusion of the ECI in the Treaty of 
Lisbon reforms represents the institutional and political act that provides the precursor  
for European citizens to engage and give effect to their constitutent power as citizens of 
the EU. 
 
Article 11 TEU provides for citizens involvement in, and participation, in the EU’s 
activities.  Specifically, Article 11(4) gives European citizens the opportunity to invite 
the Commission to submit a legislative proposal for EU action.  Article 11(4) allows for a 
set number of European citizens from Member States to “submit any appropriate 
proposal”135 for “the purpose of implementing the Treaties.”136  The TEU provides for 
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the legal basis of the citizens initiative, commonly known as the European Citizens’ 
Initiative (ECI). In conjunction with Article 11(4), Article 24 of the TFEU provides the 
legal basis for how the ECI must be implemented, specifically by requiring the 
“European Parliament and the Council [to] adopt the provisions for the procedures and 
conditions required for a citizens’ initiative within the meaning of Article 11 [TEU.]”137 
The following section of this paper will describe and outline the technical and legal 
requirements of the ECI, and the value and potential impact the ECI could have on the 
EU’s democratic system as it currently exists.  I will then argue that the ECI provides a 
starting point for EU citizens to utilise their constituent  power with the potential of 
altering the EU’s constitutional and Treaty foundations. 
 
S. The Legal Basis of the European Citizens Initiative 
Article 11 TEU provides the legal basis for the ECI.  Article 11 seeks to reinforce the 
concept of the EU as an organisation that maintains open and democratic processes.  
The EU seeks to foster participatory democracy by ensuring that the “institutions shall, 
by appropriate means, give citizens and representative associations the opportunity to 
make known and publicly exchange their views in all areas of Union action.”138 As we 
have seen, this opportunity to make known, and exchange views exists in theory, but is 
quite limited in practice. Article 11 requires that the ECI is supported by a minimum of 
one million European citizens.  However, there are a number of formal legal 
requirements that must be met before an ECI can be submitted to the Commission for 
consideration.  
 
To give effect to the requirements for the ECI under the TEU, the Council and the 
European Parliament adopted Regulation 211/2011 which set out the specific 
requirements for citizens who want to organise and submit an ECI.  The ECI is defined 
under Article 2(1) in similar wording from Article 11 TEU.  It states that an ECI proposal 
may be submitted where it “has received the support of at least one million eligible 
signatories coming from at least one quarter of all Member States.”139 An important part 
of the initiative is the definition of who is eligible to support an ECI proposal.  
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Regulation 211/2011 defines signatories as “citizens of the Union”.140 Citizens of the 
Union refers to anyone who holds the citizenship of an EU Member State.  This 
represents a clear example of a unique political power that is only afforded to Union 
citizens and provides another way the EU has worked to enhance the concept of the 
European citizen to one that includes greater political power and the opportunity to 
“exercise their rights across borders.”141 
 
For citizens rights to be exercised using the ECI, a number of strict criteria set out under 
Regulation 211/2011 must be met.  The requirements are contained under Article 3 of 
Regulation 211/2011, and I will summarise these requirements. The organisers of an 
ECI “shall be citizens of the Union”142 who are also entitled to vote in European 
Parliament elections. The organisers of an ECI are then required to form a citizens’ 
committee of “at least seven persons who are residents of at least seven different 
Member States.”143 This requirement helps to provide legitimacy to the argument that if 
the organising committee represents a number of different Member States, this suggests 
that the proposal that an ECI is suggesting is representative of a shared view throughout 
the EU. 
 
Once the requirements of Article 3 have been fulfilled, and before signatures are 
collected, the organising committee must register the ECI with the Commission. The 
Commission is required to register a proposed ECI provided the organisers have 
fulfilled a further set of specific requirements about the proposed ECI.  Organisers must 
ensure that; a citizens’ committee has been formed and contact persons designated,144 
the proposed ECI does not “manifestly fall outside of the Commission’s powers to 
submit a proposal for a legal act,”145 the proposed ECI “is not manifestly abusive, 
frivolous or vexatious,”146 and the proposed ECI is not manifestly contrary to the values 
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of the Union.”147 If the Commission considers that a proposal does not fulfil any of these 
requirements, it is required to refuse the registration of that proposal. 
 
 After assessing the regulatory requirements established under Regulation 211/2011, it 
is clear that the EU is working to broaden the ability of European citizens to enter into 
the political decision-making process.  The ECI provides a straightforward process to 
enable European citizen’s to express their views in a way that was previously not 
possible.  However, because of the need to strictly adhere to the procedural 
requirements of the Regulation it suggests a degree of reluctance on the part of the 
existing institutions to cede too greater power to citizens to initiate legislative 
proposals.  
 
T. Who Cannot offer Support in an ECI 
Article 11(4) TEU requires that in order to agree to a proposed initiative, a person must 
be a citizen of a Member State.  Regulation 211/2011 clearly sets out the exact 
participatory requirements for citizens.  It is important to note that Regulation 
211/2011 excludes a large group of people who live within the EU.  Article 3(4) sets the 
eligibility requirements to support an ECI by specifying that “signatories shall be 
citizens of the Union and be of the age to be entitled to vote in elections to the European 
Parliament.”148 While this is a very broad inclusion, it totally excludes the ability of third 
country nationals from supporting a proposed ECI. It is suggested that this total 
exclusion of third country nationals to support an ECI “might seem difficult to square 
with the Union’s own longstanding aspiration of treating at least long-term resident 
TCNs on an equal footing”149 as European citizens.  This exclusion could reflect “a 
deliberate constitutional choice about the underlying role of the new CI”150 as an 
institutional mechanism in the political decision-making process of the EU. Dougan 
argues that the ECI’s purpose is “not only to offer fresh channels for public participation 
… but also to foster a greater sense of European identity.”151 This attempt to foster 
greater “European-ness” is extremly important as it represents another way in which 
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the EU is attempting to develop greater importance and develop the benefits related to 
the possession of EU citizenship in addition to national citizenship.  This development in 
EU law reflects the EU’s mission “to promote a stronger “European political identity””152 
which I suggest, in time, could lead to the effective development of a coherent 
constituent body that has the ability to alter the constitutional framework of the EU. 
 
U. What is the ECI’s purpose 
Now that the regulatory requirements for the establishment and organisation of an ECI 
have been described, it is necessary to determine the exact scope of what an ECI can 
achieve. This includes determinig what an ECI cannot do.  Article 11(4) TEU explicitly 
sets out that any proposed ECI can only invite the Commission to act “within the 
framework of its powers.”153 In otherwords, proposed legislative acts have to be 
“required for the purpose of implementing the Treaties.”154  
 
What is the purpose of the ECI? “The ECI basically has a normative purpose.”155 Its 
purpose is to propose a suggestion for legislative action by the competent EU 
institutions.  This action has the ability to be be either positive or negative in its effect. It 
can “promot[e] a new legal act, amend[] an existing one, or abolish[] another.”156 The 
ECI is the result of a legislative action by the EU and its current form, does not form part 
of the EU’s constitutional arrangements. Furthermore, according to Andreas Auer, it 
“does not give citizens the right to launch the process of amending the constitution.”157 
This statement is based on the interpretation of the wording of the Article 11.  The TEU 
clearly states that ECI’s may only be proposed for changes in areas where that are 
within the framework of the Commission’s powers to act.  If, at this stage, an ECI is not 
capable of bringing about constitutional amendments it is necessary to establish what 
type of reforms an ECI proposal can bring about. 
 
V. What can an ECI proposal do 
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The ECI may therefore “be related to any area in which the Union, according to the 
Constitution, has competencies.”158 While Auer refers to the Draft Constitutional Treaty, 
this can be interpreted to mean the reforms to the TEU under the Treaty of Lisbon as 
part of the constitutional treaties.  An ECI may ask the Commission to submit a proposal 
for a legal act using any of the legislative options available to the Commission.  
 
The specific legislative acts are provided for under the TFEU.  Article 288 provides for 
three binding, and two non-binding legislative acts.  These legislative acts are 
“regulations, directives, decisions, recommendations and opinions.”159  Regulations 
“shall have general application [and] shall be binding in its entirety and directly 
applicable in all Member States.”160 This power of direct effect, similar to legislation 
based by a national parliament, can be compared to a decision of an EU institution.  In 
contrast to the universal application of regulations, a decision is binding in its entirety.  
A decision “specifies those to whom it is addressed [and] shall be binding only on 
them.”161 Article 289 provides that “[t]he ordinary legislative procedure shall consist in 
the joint adoption by the European Parliament and the Council of a regulation, directive 
or decision on a proposal from the Commission.” When deciding which would be the 
most appropriate form of legislative act for an ECI to take there must be consideration 
of what a proposal is seeking to achieve, but is it for the organising committee, or the 
Commission to decide?  Auer suggests that “one would expect that the decision as to the 
appropriate form … could only be taken by the organ which has the sole power to 
initiate legal acts”162, the Commission. 
 
This reflects a strict interpretation of the extent of an ECI.  In contrast, the wording of 
Article 11 (4) it is suggested, was drafted “without much opportunity … for public 
scrutiny and reflection”163 which means that “the potential scope of the [E]CI is … both 
broad and yet constricted.”164 This scope is wide because an ECI is “an invitation to the 
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European Commission to propose a law in a field where it has the power to do so[.]”165 
As a result, this means that an ECI proposal could ask the Commission to exercise its 
power of initating both a legislative procedure as well as the adoption “of non-
legilslative measures or indeed any other form of Union legal act (such as non-binding 
recommendations).”166 The question of what type of proposal can be submitted to the 
Commission for a suggested legal act depends on the interpertation of Article 11(4) 
which requires that the Commission must “submit” a proposal for Union action.  The 
requirement of the Commission to submit a proposal suggests that an ECI is restricted 
to decision-making procedures that the Commission initiates, but requires other 
institutions to pass.  On this interpretation, it would exclude acts of which the 
Commission may act autonomously.  Dougan suggests that the difficulty exists in 
determining to what extent the ECI may request a proposal of any nature is limited 
because of the wording of Article 11(4) TEU.  Specifically, that an ECI is “required for the 
purpose of implementing the Treaties.” He continues by arguing the choice of wording 
in the drafting of Article 11(4) means that it is debatable whether it “was intended to 
rule out calls for actually changing, rather than merely implementing, the current 
Treaties[.]”167 
 
Supporting the idea that that an ECI proposal could ultimately work to alter the Treaty 
provisions relies on a joint interpretation of Article 11(4) TEU in conjunction with 
Articles 2 and 3 TEU which set out the EU’s values and objectives.   If an ECI had the 
ability to do this, it could “well necessitate the amendment of existing Treaty provisions 
or the introduction of new ones[.]”168 This would be a significant step in the 
development of participatory democracy in the EU and would work to move power 
away from the Member States and place it in the hands of European citizens.  
 
W. The ECI – Developing the European Citizen and Participatory Democracy 
The importance of the ECI cannot be understatated.  It is working to enhance the 
powers of European citizens through active participation in the democratic life of the 
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Union.  This paper has already discussed the ways in which EU institutions have sought 
to provide effective representative democracy for EU citizens.  However, only through 
participation and involvement can European citizens become truly involved in the 
democratic process which would further work to develop the concept of a ‘European 
citizen’ capabable of exercising constitutent power. 
 
This paper has focused so far on the legal requirements of an ECI and the theoretical 
discussion of potential changes an ECI could have on the Treaty system.  I will now 
briefly highlight the existing methods of participatory democracy in the EU, and how the 
ECI adds a significant opportunity for civil society participation. One existing form of 
participatory democracy in the EU is the Commission’s exisiting practice of consultation 
during the agenda-setting phase of new legislation.  This consultation “takes place prior 
to the formal legislative process and is testimony to the role of civil society in the 
agenda-setting phases of the legislative process.”169 In addition to the Commission’s 
consultation process, two further rights exist for participation.  These are, a citizen’s 
right to petition the European Parliament directly, and the right to complain to the 
European Ombudsman. 
 
The Right to petition the European Parliament allows EU citizens to suggest 
“improvements or changes that might address existing problems.”170 Petitions can be 
submitted to highlight that a new law or action is needed.  This is a useful tool for 
individual citizens to draw attention to particular issues but lacks features of the ECI 
which makes the ECI a much more valuable and effective method of engaging with 
European decision makers.  The ECI is arguably a more effective form of participatory 
democracy because after receiving a petition, “the European Parliament is not obliged to 
act on any given petition”.171  Article 20(d) of the TFEU  provides for this right to 
petition the European Parliament.  Another restriction on the individual petition is that 
citizen’s may petition only “on a matter which comes within the Union’s fields of activity 
and which affects him, her or it directly.”172 The right to petition presents a more 
indirect form of citizen participation, in can only be used to call on the European 
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Parliament “to request a proposal from the Commission, while a successful [ECI] 
directly obliges the Commission to act.”173 Additionally, the European Ombudsman 
allows for European citizens to lodge official complaints about perceived cases of mal-
administration in the EU institutions.  However, the powers of the Ombudsman are even 
more limited in how they can influence EU legislation.  The ultimate power the 
Ombudsman has is submit a report to the European Parliament, and this measure is 
only taken as a final option.   All three of these elements of participatory democracy 
show a willingness of the EU to engage with European citizens. However, “none of them 
gives citizens the opportunity to play a direct role in initiating EU legislation.”174 The 
ECI presents a new method of citizen participation at the EU level.  
 
X. What Impact does the ECI have on the Demoratic Life of the EU 
 Despite debate as to the extent to which an ECI proposal may influence or change the 
EU political system, it is undisputed that it will contribute to the development of policy 
and legislation.  Analysis of Regulation 211/2011 makes it clear that the Commission 
retains significant control throughout the ECI process. This is because “it is the 
institution which will be affected to a great extent by this new instrument of 
participatory democracy.”175 For example, at the beginning of the process, during the 
registration of an ECI proposal, the Commission might be required to “judge politically 
sensitive issues [and whether] these [proposals] might not even stand a chance of 
reaching the one-million threshold.”176 In addition to having to provide administrative 
support for ECI proposal organisers, the Commission will be under scrutiny from 
interest groups and will “will have to find a balanced position for itself on the scale 
going from total submission towards total control.”177  
 
Total control over an ECI proposal would mean that “the Commission would be 
refraining from putting ECIs through, even if they met all the formal requirements 
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purely at its own discretion.”178 This would create a situation where the Commission 
became a “mere connecting link”179 between European citizens and the legislative 
institutions of the EU.   The opposite total control position would “mean that the 
Commission would be refraining from putting ECIs through, even if they met all the 
formal requirements, purely at its own discretion.”180 As Szeligowska and Mincheva 
recognise, it is important for the Commission to find an appropriate balance between 
these two positions because if the Commission was to totally submit, the Commission’s 
position would arguably deteriorate, while the opposite could “degrade the newly 
implemented procedure [and could] reinforce the perception of [the Commission] as a 
technocratic, distant, institution.”181 An appropriate balance between these two is 
important because of the influential role that the Commission has throughout the entire 
ECI process.  Mehr Demokratie’s response to the Commission on the ECI effectively 
summarises this position.  
“[The] ECI offers significant possibilities for the development of European civil society and of 
European public space and thus for democracy itself at the EU level – as long as the Commission, 
as the intended recipient of such intiatives, makes active use of the opportunity the ECI presents 
for engaging intensively with the citizens.”182 
If the Commission does work to actively engage with citizens throughout the ECI 
process and recognises the ECI process as a significant tool for participatory democracy 
in the EU.  
 
Furthermore, a useful consequence of the ECI as an institutional tool would be if a 
proposal is made that is similar to something on the Commission’s own agenda.  With 
the Commission working towards a policy objective, combined with “one million 
citizens signing such an initiative could be a strong argument for the Commission in its 
negotiation with the Parliament and the Council.”183 With an ECI supporting a 
Commission proposal, the ECI could become a powerful tool for the Commission to use 
to its advantage in the “case of opposition with the Council [as] representatives of 
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national governments … might not find it easy … to go against the voice of civil 
society.”184 Pressure such as this provides another strong example of how the ECI is 
slowly changing the constitutional structure of the EU.  Whereas previously the 
legislative process was mainly between the Commission, the Council, and the European 
Parliament, by adding the ECI as an effective fourth institution with input, the existing 
institutions and the Member States would be extremely unwise to ignore a proposal 
that has gathered significant support throughout the EU. 
 
Y. How the ECI process creates the European Citizen 
Several specific elements work to further contribute to the creation of the European 
citizen as a separate and combined group of citizens from throughout the Member 
States.  The ‘emotional element’ gives European citizens “the feeling that they are part of 
a normal society and they participate effectively in the decisions-making process[.]”185 
This is done by making European co-initators of legislative proposals, a very powerful 
and influential tool. Furthermore, the ‘cognitive element’ helps citizens to realise that 
their voice and opinion is being heard “through the medium of initiatives and is taken 
into consideration”186 by the EU institutions. Finally, the ‘political element’ is the 
political reality for the EU institutions that the “citizens represent the new political 
“actor” who joined the European  institutions in drafting and adopting … the legislation 
of the EU.”187 If European citizens possess the knowledge and certainty of being able to 
amend or implement European legislation, this lends support to continuning the 
development of the Euoprean citizen identity, as more than just something that is 
associated with the economic aims of the EU.  
 
By utilising the ECI, it is hoped that citizens will  understand and recognise that their 
European citizen identity is unique and important, capable of influencing real and 
meaningful change at the EU level. 
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Z. Citizens influencing the agenda – an analysis of European Citizen Initiatives 
to date 
To gain a practical understanding of how the ECI process may impact and possibly 
change the EU’s constitutional system, I will now discuss and analyse some of the ECI 
proposals that have been submitted to the Commission.  By doing this it will provide an 
understanding of the issues that European citizens consider important, and to what 
extent the change on the EU’s laws and policies these ECI’s have had. 
 
As of 27 May 2014, there have been 8 ECI’s “registered on the offical website of the 
European Commission.”188 Reflecting the desire for ECI’s to help create European 
citizens, certain ECI proposals registered since April 2012 until May 2014 “have been 
translated into almost or into all langauges”189 of the EU.  Depending on the nature of 
the ECI and the intended goal, the availability of the ECI in different languages highlights 
how effective organising committees may be at gaining support, or attempting to gain 
support, throughout the EU.  While individual ECI’s may not on the first analysis appear 
to have significant constitutional aspirations or seek to alter the fundamental structure 
of the EU, by looking at ECI proposals objectives, the desire for further integration by 
European citizens becomes clear.  
 
For example, the first ECI registered on the Commission’s website is called “Fraternité 
2020 – Mobility. Progress. Europe (F2020)”.190 Despite being unable to gain the 
required number of signatures to support the initiative, the proposal reflected the belief 
that the EU needed “to re-focus its integration efforts on the level of individaul 
European citizens to build a genuine European Union of people, not states.”191 
 
 Another initiative that is aimed at promoting fundamental citizens rights is the “Let me 
vote!”192 initiative.  The ‘Let me vote!’ initative’s main objective is “to strengthen the 
rights listed in Article 20 (2) TFEU by granting EU citizens residing in another Member 
                                                        
188 Above, n 185 at 17. 
189 Ibid. 
190 Fraternité 2020 (9 May 2012) <http://ec.europa.eu/citizens-
initiative/public/initiatives/obsolete/details/2012/000001>. 
191 Fraternité 2020 <http://en.fraternite2020.eu/summary.html>. 
192 Let me vote (28 January 2014) <http://ec.europa.eu/citizens-
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James Gallagher 
 46 
State the right to vote in all political elections in their country of residence, in the same 
conditions as the nationals of the State.” The organising group, Europeens Sans 
Frontieres, states that the main reason for this particular initiative was the need “to 
reduce the existing democratic deficit by ensuring a better political mobility to all the 
European citizens to exercise freely their right to vote in the local and European 
elections … on a permanent basis.”193Similarly, Europeens Sans Frontieres argues that if 
Europeans were given the right to vote in all elections of the country in which they are 
resident, this would “give each European the feeling of a common destinty, of being at 
home where he or she is within the European Union.”194 The group states that it was its 
desire to “promote fuller European citizenship” that led to its decision to launch the ‘Let 
me vote!’ ECI.   
 
This initiative was was registered on the Commission’s website on 28 January 2013, and 
the period for the collection of signatures has closed.  According to the official register 
of ECI’s it is unknown whether this initiative has been submitted to the Commission and 
“whether the organisers managed or failed to collect the required number of 
signatures.”195 
 
The two previous example while both were ultimately unsuccessful to achieve the 
stated objectives, they highlight the existence of awareness of citizens who desire 
greater rights as European citizens, with the goal of “strengthening their participation in 
the European political life.”196Petrescu strongly advocates that the ECI is an appropriate 
tool to strengthen European participatory democracy and believes that “the proper 
implementation of this instrument will bring only benefits for the European Union … 
and for almost 500 million citizens … acting as “co-authors” in the European legislative 
process[.]”197Furthermore, it is believed that the ECI has the chance “to become a policy-
creating instrument that will impove citizens’ influence in the EU political context by 
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reinforcing the exchange of civic competence and fostering civic inclusion at the 
supranational level.”198 
 
AA. Opposition to the European Citizens’ Initiative 
Throughout this paper, the extent to which citizens of EU Member States has been 
analysed and discussed.  The ECI has been identified as a significant way for increasing 
democratic participation  of European citizens throughout the EU. However, there was 
not universal support for the idealistic democratic goals many held for the ECI.  Before 
the ECI process was implemented, it was identified that the possibility exists “that if too 
many initiatives have to be rejected for formal reasons, the ECI may lead to increased 
frutration with, rather than to an enlightened understanding of, the EU as a political 
system.”199 
 
During the ECI policy development stages concerns about the ECI were raised.  These 
included the fear “that this approach would raise expectations that would be difficult to 
meet.”200As well as “the eternal question of the tension between representative and 
direct democracy”201Finally, “it was feared that the [ECI] could be used by well-
organised interest groups to promote solutions to their benefit.”202 These points were 
later addressed by the Commission, in the form of Regulation 211/2011, but they 
highlighted the difficulties faced by the EU institutions during the implementation 
stages of the ECI.  Furthermore, with the implementation of the ECI, fears existed that it 
could work to reduce the importance of other institutions, primarily, the European 
Parliament. Additionally, it is the responsibility of the European Commission “to defend 
the legal order of the EU.”203 This includes the Commission recognising areas that are 
outside of the EU’s competencies to act, so initiatives concerning “Abortion, euthanasia 
or legislation of ‘soft’ drugs will be considered inadmissible[.]”204 Another possible 
problem was identified as potentially arising if an ECI was proposed on a subject that 
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had been recently proposed by the Member States and the European Parliament.  The 
problem arises if the Member States and the European Parliament thad found a solution 
to an issue which is also the subject of an ECI, although the solution adopted was 
different to that proposed by the ECI.  If this were to occur, it would be necessary to 
determine “[w]hose claim should be more important to the European Commission[?]”205 
If an ECI option was preferred, the quesiton that remains is “[w]ould it not weaken the 
legimiacy of EU institutions?”206  Now that the ECI process has been in effect for two 
years, I argue that these concerns while legitimate, have not eventuated in a situation 
where institutions such as the European Parliament, have been relegated in importance 
or influence.  
 
V. CONCLUSION – The European Citizens’ Initiative – Creating the European 
Citizen 
This paper has sought to provide a critical reflection on an important aspect of the EU’s 
democratic constitutional framework, the citizens of the EU who are affected by the 
decisions of the EU institutions and Member States.  It has described the development of 
the EU towards creating greater rights and privileges for citizens in an attempt to foster 
a stronger sense of unity in Europe, of not simply Member States, but that of European 
citizens.  
 
History has demonstrated that despite repeated efforts by the institutions and the 
Member States, citizens have rejected integration that appears to create European 
citizenship to the detriment of national citizenship.  In a new attempt to help the 
integration process, the EU introduced the ECI as a tool to increase participatory 
democracy in the EU and provide citizen engagement in a way that has not been 
possible at the EU level.  This article has argued that the ECI is a useful tool for 
addressing some of the short comings of EU democracy by allowing citizens to provide 
direct input in the crucial development of legislation stages.  
 
While the constitutional structure of the EU as it currently exists can only be changed by 
the Member States through the existing treaty revision process, the ECI may serve as a 
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springboard for citizens to enhance their involvement in the constitutional process, 
through the exericse of their constituent power.  The article suggests that only by 
developing a cohesive and united European citizen body, is constituent power possible. 
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